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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 The principal issue in this case is whether New Jersey 
or Pennsylvania law applies to an automobile insurance 
dispute between Amica Mutual Insurance Company 
(“Amica”) and Edward and Maureen Fogel, individually and 
as guardians ad litem of Marcy Fogel and Carrie Fogel, and 
as administrators of the estate of Melissa Fogel (collectively, 
the “Fogels”).  Amica issued the policy to the Fogels when 
they were residents of New Jersey.  During its term, the 
Fogels moved to Pennsylvania, and made Amica aware of 
their permanent relocation, before they were involved in a 
fatal traffic accident in Pennsylvania that triggered the policy 
claim to Amica.  The District Court granted declaratory relief 
to Amica at the summary judgment stage, believing that New 
Jersey law applied to the contract.  We conclude that 
Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law rules do not apply; instead,  we 
look to New Jersey’s choice-of-law rules, and they point to 
Pennsylvania law as governing this dispute.  We remand so 
that summary judgment may be entered for the Fogels on the 
choice-of-law issue.  However, we affirm the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment to Amica on the Fogels’ 
counterclaim alleging that it engaged in a bad faith denial of 
insurance coverage.   
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  Facts 
Amica insured the Fogels under an automobile 
insurance policy (the “policy” or “contract”) effective from 
December 1, 2007 through December 1, 2008.  The Fogels 
lived in Howell, New Jersey when the policy was issued.  It 
provided underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of 
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$300,000 for each accident.  The Fogels moved to Pottsville, 
Pennsylvania in August 2008.   
The same month of their move, Mr. Fogel called 
Amica to advise his insurer that he had moved from New 
Jersey to Pennsylvania with the intent to remain there 
permanently.  An Amica representative informed Mr. Fogel 
that his policy would need to be rewritten in Pennsylvania.  A 
few days later, Mr. Fogel spoke with an Amica senior account 
representative and asked that his policy be converted to, or 
reissued as, a Pennsylvania policy, due to his family’s 
relocation to Pennsylvania.  The Amica representative told 
Mr. Fogel that Amica would not issue a Pennsylvania policy 
until he obtained a Pennsylvania driver’s license and 
registered his two vehicles in Pennsylvania, and that until that 
time his New Jersey policy would remain in effect.  She also 
obtained Mr. Fogel’s new home address in Pennsylvania.  
Amica began billing the Fogels for their insurance premiums 
at their residence in Pennsylvania in September 2008.  Mr. 
Fogel did not obtain a Pennsylvania driver’s license or 
register his vehicles in Pennsylvania until early 2009.   
In October 2008, Mr. Fogel and three children in the 
Fogel family were in a serious automobile accident in 
Pennsylvania.  Their vehicle was struck head-on by a motorist 
who was allegedly intoxicated—one of the Fogel daughters 
died as a result of the accident and Mr. Fogel and the other 
two Fogel daughters were seriously injured.  The driver of the 
vehicle that struck the Fogels had liability insurance with a 
limit of $100,000, which has been paid to the Fogels in 
settlement of their claims against him.  At the time of the 
accident, the Fogels’ policy with Amica had not been 
rewritten or reissued as a Pennsylvania policy.  
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After the accident, Amica established a New Jersey 
personal injury protection (“PIP”) file for each of the four 
injured Fogel family members.  It then processed their 
medical expenses pursuant to New Jersey PIP coverage, 
which, under New Jersey law, had limits of $250,000 per 
person per accident.   
The Fogels, however, believed that they were entitled 
to more.  In December 2008, their counsel wrote a letter to 
Amica requesting payment up to the limits of the “stacked” 
underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits available under their 
policy as a result of the accident.  Under Pennsylvania law, 
insureds whose policies cover more than one vehicle may 
“stack” UIM benefits to cover losses that result from a 
collision with an at-fault underinsured driver—that is, the 
insured may add together the policy limits for each of the 
covered vehicles even though the collision involved only one 
of the covered vehicles.  Stacking is available in Pennsylvania 
unless the insured expressly waives that right in writing, but it 
is not permitted in New Jersey.  Moreover, insurers in 
Pennsylvania may not offset UIM benefits by amounts 
insureds receive from other insurance sources, whereas such 
offsets are permitted in New Jersey.   
Amica’s position in response was “that ‘stacking’ [of 
UIM benefits on the Fogels’ two automobiles] is prohibited 
under the New Jersey policy.”  Counsel for the Fogels again 
wrote to Amica stating that, under Pennsylvania law, the 
Fogels are entitled to stacked UIM benefits of up to $600,000 
(as their policy covered two cars with limits of $300,000 
each).  After receiving that letter, Amica’s claims adjuster 
confirmed that the Fogels had been residing in Pennsylvania 
since August 2008.  He also confirmed that Mr. Fogel 
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communicated with Amica before the accident regarding his 
relocation to Pennsylvania.   
B.  Procedural History  
In January 2009, Amica filed an action in the Superior 
Court of New Jersey seeking a declaration that its obligations 
under the policy are only those that it owes under New Jersey 
law (not Pennsylvania law).  The Fogels successfully 
petitioned for removal to the District Court for the District of 
New Jersey.  On the District Court’s own motion, the action 
was transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which provides that “[f]or 
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any 
other district or division where it might have been brought.” 
Amica filed an amended complaint in July 2009 
seeking a declaration that it owed no further UIM benefits to 
the Fogels.  In the alternative, if the District Court applied 
Pennsylvania law, Amica sought return of payments it had 
made for New Jersey PIP benefits in excess of the amount it 
would have provided under Pennsylvania law ($5,000 per 
person).     
After discovery, the Fogels filed an amended answer 
and Amica moved for summary judgment on the choice-of-
law issue.  The Fogels filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment on the same issue and made a counterclaim alleging 
bad faith by Amica’s claims adjuster under 42 Pa. C.S.A. 
§ 8317.  Amica also moved for summary judgment on the 
Fogels’ bad faith claim.   
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The motions and counterclaims were submitted to a 
Magistrate Judge, who prepared a Report and 
Recommendation (“R&R”) for the District Court.  The R&R 
applied Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law rules and concluded 
that New Jersey law applies to the automobile insurance 
policy.  Thus, the R&R suggested that Amica’s motion for 
summary judgment be granted and the Fogels’ cross-motion 
for summary judgment be denied.  It also recommended that 
summary judgment be granted in favor of Amica on the 
Fogels’ counterclaim for bad faith. 
The District Court adopted the Magistrate’s R&R, 
granted Amica’s motion for summary judgment, and denied 
the Fogels’ cross-motion for summary judgment.  See District 
Court Memorandum of July 29, 2010 (“Dist. Ct. Memo”).1
                                              
1 The District Court dismissed all of the Fogels’ objections to 
the R&R.  The only objection it addressed in its opinion was 
the Fogels’ argument that it was not possible to meet Amica’s 
requirement that an insured who moves to a new state obtain 
a driver’s license and registration in the new state before 
Amica will issue a new insurance policy in that state.  This 
requirement was impossible to meet, the Fogels argued, 
because Pennsylvania requires proof of insurance prior to 
registering a vehicle in the Commonwealth.  The District 
Court concluded that this sequencing problem did not make it 
impossible for the Fogels to follow Amica’s procedures 
because the Pennsylvania vehicle registration office and 
insurers may “‘swap’ information simultaneously to meet 
both Amica’s and the Commonwealth’s procedure.”  Dist. Ct. 
Memo at 6-7. 
  
The Fogels appealed.   
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We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review an order granting summary judgment de novo.  
Gardner v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 544 F.3d 553, 557-
58 (3d Cir. 2009).  We also exercise plenary review over a 
district court’s determination of which state’s substantive law 
governs in a civil action based on diversity of citizenship.  
Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 462 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (citing Garcia v. Plaza Oldsmobile Ltd., 421 F.3d 
216, 219 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A. Choice-of-Law Framework 
In an action based on diversity of citizenship, a federal 
court generally applies the choice-of-law rules of the 
jurisdiction in which it sits.  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. 
Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 
480 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying Klaxon); Garcia, 
421 F.3d at 219 (same).  However, Van Dusen v. Barrack 
established that when a civil action is transferred from one 
district court to another pursuant to § 1404(a) on motion of 
the defendant, the transferee forum must apply the law of the 
initial forum.  376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964) (“[W]here the 
defendants seek transfer [under § 1404(a)], the transferee 
district court must be obligated to apply the state law that 
would have been applied if there had been no change of 
venue.”).  The Supreme Court extended the Van Dusen rule to 
transfers initiated by the plaintiff in Ferens v. John Deere 
Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990).  Thus, after transfer by either party, 
when “[f]aced with a choice-of-law question, federal courts in 
the district to which the case has been transferred under 
§ 404(a) must apply the law of the transferor state.”  Lafferty 
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v. St. Riel, 495 F.3d 72, 76-77 (citing Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 
639, and Ferens, 494 U.S. at 527-28).   
Ferens also makes plain that the Van Dusen rule 
applies to sua sponte transfers, such as occurred here.  “[T]he 
transferor law should apply regardless of who makes the 
§ 1404(a) motion,” in part because a contrary rule “would 
leave unclear which law should apply when both a defendant 
and a plaintiff move for a transfer of venue or when the court 
transfers venue on its own motion.”  Ferens, 494 U.S. at 530-
31 (emphasis added).  We agree with the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals that “[t]he language and reasoning in Ferens leave 
no doubt that the [Van Dusen] rule equally is applicable 
where a district court transfers an action sua sponte.”  
Muldoon v. Tropitone Furniture Co., 1 F.3d 964, 966 (9th 
Cir. 1993); see also In re Helicopter Crash Near Weaverville, 
California 8/5/08, 714 F.Supp.2d. 1098, 1102 (D.Or. 2010) 
(construing Ferens as “finding that whether the transferor 
court grants a [§] 1404(a) transfer sua sponte, at the 
defendant’s request, or at the plaintiff’s urging, ‘the transferee 
court must follow the choice of law rules of the transferor 
court.’”).  Thus, we hold that Ferens compels application of 
the Van Dusen rule to sua sponte transfers pursuant to 
§ 1404(a).   
This civil action was brought in New Jersey state 
court.  It was then removed to the District of New Jersey.  
That Court sua sponte transferred the case to the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania under § 1404(a).  Likely because 
neither party referred to Van Dusen or Ferens, the District 
Court in the Middle District of Pennsylvania did not apply the 
choice-of-law rules of the transferor forum (New Jersey).  
Instead, it applied Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law rules rather 
than New Jersey’s.  We proceed by applying New Jersey’s 
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choice-of-law rules to determine whether Pennsylvania or 
New Jersey substantive law controls the merits of the dispute 
before us.    
B. New Jersey Choice-of-Law Approach  
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
v. Estate of Simmons, 84 N.J. 28, 36-37, 417 A.2d 488 (N.J. 
1980) (“Simmons”)), the New Jersey Supreme Court “rejected 
the mechanical and inflexible lex loci contractus [law of the 
place where the contract is made] rule in resolving conflict-
of-law issues in liability-insurance contracts,” as it later 
explained in Gilbert Spruance Company v. Pennsylvania 
Manufacturers’ Ass’n Insurance Co., 134 N.J. 96, 629 A.2d 
885, 888 (N.J. 1993) (“Gilbert”).  Since Simmons, “[New 
Jersey] courts have adopted a more flexible approach that 
focuses on the state that has the most significant connections 
with the parties and the transaction.”  Gilbert, 629 A.2d at 
888 (citation omitted).  Gilbert explained that approach, 
known as the “most significant relationship” test in the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) 
(“Restatement”), as follows: 
[In Simmons, w]e held that because the law of 
the place of contract “generally comport[s] with 
the reasonable expectations of the parties 
concerning the principal situs of the insured 
risk,” . . . that forum’s law should be applied 
“unless the dominant and significant 
relationship of another state to the parties and 
the underlying issue dictates that this basic rule 
should yield.” . . .  In making that 
determination, courts should rely on the factors 
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and contacts set forth in Restatement sections 6 
and 188. 
Id. (citing Simmons, 417 A.2d at 492-93).   
Simmons emphasized the importance of considering 
the parties’ expectations regarding the principal location of 
the insured risk as the rationale for looking to the place of 
contracting.  However, it also recognized that “this choice-of-
law rule should not be given controlling or dispositive effect.”  
Simmons, 417 A.2d at 493.  That is, “[i]t should not be 
applied without a full comparison of the significant 
relationship of each state with the parties and the transaction.”  
Id.  Moreover, “[t]hat assessment should encompass an 
evaluation of important state contacts as well as a 
consideration of the state policies affected by, and 
governmental interest in, the outcome of the controversy.”  
Id.  
Though Simmons stopped short of adopting the 
Restatement expressly, Gilbert and a series of later New 
Jersey Appellate Division cases made clear that “the 
governmental interest test [dealt with below] and the ‘most 
significant relationship’ standard of the Restatement” provide 
the applicable choice-of-law framework in New Jersey courts.  
N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. MacVicar, 307 N.J. Super. 507, 512, 
704 A.2d 1343, 1346 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998) 
(describing Gilbert as “emphasizing again that[,] with respect 
to insurance contracts, the law of the place understood by the 
parties to be the principal location of the risk controls unless 
some other state has a more significant relationship”).  See 
also Canal Ins. v. F.W. Clukey Trucking, 295 N.J. Super. 131, 
684 A.2d 953 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996); Hertz Claim 
Mgmt. v. Marchetta, 281 N.J. Super. 190, 656 A.2d 1298 
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(N.J. Super. App. Div. 1995); Chalef v. Ryerson, 277 N.J. 
Super. 22, 648 A.2d 1139 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1994); 
Pittston Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 795 F. Supp. 678, 683 (D.N.J. 
1992) (collecting cases and explaining that “New Jersey 
Appellate Division decisions have made clear that the 
Restatement’s  “most significant relationship” test is the law 
of New Jersey”). 
Under the Restatement approach, “the general rule in 
contract actions is that the law of the state with the most 
significant relationship to the parties and the transaction 
under the principles stated in Restatement section 6 governs.”  
Gilbert, 629 A.2d at 888 (citing Restatement § 188).  In 
determining which state has the most significant relationship, 
§ 188 instructs courts to evaluate each state’s contacts, 
“according to their relative importance,” such as the place of 
contracting and performance, the location of the subject 
matter of the contract, and the domicile, residence, 
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of 
the parties.  Restatement § 188(2).  Section 6 of the 
Restatement instructs courts to consider the following factors: 
“(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,  
(b) the relevant polices of the forum, (c) the relevant policies 
of other interested states and the relative interests of those 
states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the 
protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies 
underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, 
predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the 
determination and application of the law to be applied.”  
Restatement § 6; see also Gilbert, 629 A.2d at 888; Simmons, 
417 A.2d at 491.   
Section 193 of the Restatement “provides guidance in 
applying section 188’s ‘relevant contacts’ to the special case 
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of casualty-insurance contracts.”  Gilbert, 629 A.2d at 888.  
As the more specific Restatement provision, § 193 is the 
starting point “in determining the choice-of-law rule to 
govern casualty-insurance contracts.”  Id. at 893.  It provides 
that “the law of the state that ‘the parties understood was to 
be the principal location of the insured risk [governs unless] 
some other state has a more significant relationship under the 
principles stated in § 6.”  Id. at 889 (alteration in original) 
(citing Restatement §193).  Comment b to Restatement § 193 
explains that the location of the insured risk under the 
contract should generally be given “greater weight than any 
other single contact,” as Simmons and Gilbert also instruct.  
However, the importance of the principal location of the 
insured risk diminishes when the insured object is a moveable 
chattel, such as a motor vehicle.  In those cases, “the 
significance of the state of the risk’s principal location 
diminishes with the length of time that it can be anticipated 
the chattel will be in other states during the term of the 
insurance.”  Restatement §193 cmt. b.  Furthermore, on 
“occasions when following the issuance of the policy the 
principal location of the risk is shifted to some other state,” 
the “other state will have a natural interest in the insurance of 
the risk and it may be that its local law should be applied to 
determine at least some issues arising under the policy.”  Id. 
cmt. d.   
C. Application of New Jersey Choice-of-Law Rules 
to this Dispute 
The first step in our analysis is to determine whether 
an actual conflict exists between the laws of New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania.  As the Magistrate Judge’s R&R noted, the 
laws of these states conflict as follows in this case: 
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Pennsylvania law permits insureds to “stack” 
underinsured motorist benefits, whereas New 
Jersey does not.  Additionally, . . .  
Pennsylvania law does not permit insurers to 
offset UIM benefits against amounts received 
from other insurance sources, whereas New 
Jersey does.  There is thus no question that the 
differences in each state’s laws with respect to 
automobile insurance—specifically, with 
respect to how much coverage is legally 
available to insureds for underinsured motorist 
benefits—give rise to a true conflict . . . . 
R&R at 18.  We agree, as did the District Court, with the 
Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that an actual conflict exists.  
In this context, we follow the approach from Simmons, 
Gilbert, and subsequent New Jersey cases that apply the 
Restatement standards discussed above.  Although the Fogels 
did not ask us to apply New Jersey choice-of-law rules to this 
dispute, they argue that we should follow the reasoning of 
MacVicar, a New Jersey Appellate Division case that is 
strikingly similar to the case before us.  The District Court 
declined to follow MacVicar, as it applied Pennsylvania’s 
choice-of-law rules rather than New Jersey’s.  However, once 
we recognize that New Jersey’s choice-of-law rules apply, it 
is clear that MacVicar is the most closely analogous case to 
the current dispute and we are bound by it as the law of the 
transferor forum.  
MacVicar decided “whether the law of New Jersey or 
Pennsylvania govern[ed] the determination of defendant-
insureds’ entitlement to stacking of the underinsured motorist 
benefits afforded by the automobile policy issued to them by 
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[the] plaintiff [insurer,] New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance 
Company (NJM).”  MacVicar, 704 A.2d at 1344.  “The issue 
is simply one of choice of law . . . .”  Id. at 1346.  
The critical facts of MacVicar mirror closely those of 
our case.  Like the Fogels, the MacVicars lived in New Jersey 
when the disputed automobile insurance policy was issued for 
their family cars, all of which were garaged in New Jersey at 
the time.  Id. at 1344.  Also like the Fogels, the MacVicars 
moved to Pennsylvania during the term of their policy.  Id.2
                                              
2 The MacVicar family moved to Pennsylvania approximately 
six months into the term of their policy with NJM, while the 
Fogels moved to Pennsylvania approximately eight months 
into the term of their policy with Amica. The length of time 
remaining on the policy was not a consideration in MacVicar, 
nor do we consider it a critical fact here.  
  
In perhaps the most important resemblance between 
MacVicar and our case, the insurer received notice from the 
MacVicar family of their relocation to Pennsylvania by 
telephone before the accident that triggered possible 
application of the policy.  Subsequent telephone 
communication between Mrs. MacVicar and the insurer, 
NJM, occurred regarding the process of converting the 
family’s New Jersey automobile insurance policy to a 
Pennsylvania policy.  Id.  Similarly, after Mr. Fogel’s initial 
call to Amica providing notice of his family’s relocation and 
being told of the need to have the policy rewritten in 
Pennsylvania, he subsequently spoke with an Amica senior 




Again tracking closely to the facts of the case before 
us, the MacVicars’ New Jersey policy was still in force when 
the family was involved in a tragic accident that killed one 
family member (Mr. MacVicar), seriously and permanently 
injured another (Mrs. MacVicar), and less seriously injured 
the third passenger (their daughter).  Id. at 1345.  As the 
Fogels’ lawyer did, the MacVicars’ “lawyer asserted that the 
family was entitled to stacked UIM coverage.”  Id.  In 
response “NJM asserted that since the New Jersey policy was 
in effect, New Jersey’s anti-stacking law applied,” id., as 
Amica now asserts.    
The procedural history in MacVicar unfolded in much 
the same manner as here, except that the case was never 
removed to federal court from New Jersey state court.  The 
insurer, NJM, brought an action seeking a declaration that 
New Jersey law applied to the policy and that stacking was 
impermissible.  Id.  “On motion and cross-motion for 
summary judgment, the trial court agreed with NJM’s 
position,” and entered summary judgment for the insurer 
based on the choice-of-law issue.  Id. 
The New Jersey Appellate Division reversed the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment for NJM, and determined 
that Pennsylvania law applied.  It concluded that “the choice 
of Pennsylvania law is dictated by the well-settled principles 
underlying [New Jersey’s] conflicts of law jurisprudence in 
respect of insurance contracts.”  Id. at 1346.  It explained the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s approach in Simmons and 
Gilbert, and went on to apply the Restatement to the facts 
before it, using § 193 as its starting point per Gilbert, 629 
A.2d at 893.  Our analysis, set forth below, tracks closely to 
that of MacVicar in its application of New Jersey’s settled 
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choice-of-law principles in the context of insurance contract 
disputes.  
Principal Location of the Insured Risk 
MacVicar began its analysis under the Restatement by 
examining the parties’ justified expectations regarding the 
principal location of the insured risk.  “Applying the test of 
§ 193 of the Restatement,” the Court stated, “we think it plain 
that the parties understood that[,] as of the date of the 
MacVicars’ move to Pennsylvania, a date and an event of 
which NJM indisputably had notice prior to the accident, 
Pennsylvania would be the principal location of the risk.”  Id. 
at 1347.  The reasons cited for this conclusion are virtually 
identical to the reasons that the Fogels now argue Amica must 
have understood Pennsylvania to be the principal location of 
the insured risk once the Fogels made the insurer aware of 
their relocation:  “The insureds all resided [in Pennsylvania].  
The covered vehicles were all garaged there.  The insureds 
would be doing all their local driving there.  [The insurer], 
moreover, . . . clearly acknowledged its understanding that the 
locus of the risk had been transferred to Pennsylvania . . . .”  
Id. 
For the same reasons expressed in MacVicar, we 
believe the justified expectations of the parties shifted when 
Amica was put on notice that the Fogel family had 
permanently relocated to Pennsylvania.  Because the Fogels 
had notified Amica of their move in August 2008, well before 
the accident, garaged and were primarily driving their cars in 
Pennsylvania, and were being billed by Amica in 
Pennsylvania, we find it difficult to believe that any party 
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could have believed the primary location of the insured risk 
was still New Jersey by the time the accident occurred.3
While Amica argues correctly that it advised the 
Fogels of steps they needed to take before it would rewrite 
their policy under Pennsylvania law, the key focus of our 
inquiry under Restatement § 193 is not whether the Fogels 
undertook these steps before the accident, but whether the 
parties understood that the principal location of the insured 
risk was Pennsylvania.  In other words, the issue is not 
whether the policy was actually  rewritten as a Pennsylvania 
policy before the accident—all parties acknowledge that it 
was not (and if it had been, there would be no dispute)—
rather, the issue that the Restatement and New Jersey law 
instruct courts to consider is what the parties believed 
regarding where the insured risk would be located.  We 
conclude that there was simply no justified expectation after 
   
                                              
3 The only discernible difference at this stage of the analysis 
between MacVicar and this case is that more time had passed 
between the Fogels’ communication with Amica and the 
MacVicars’ communication with NJM when the accident in 
question occurred.  It is inconceivable to us that the insurer’s 
“understanding that the locus of the risk had been transferred 
to Pennsylvania,” id., would be diminished by the passage of 
time, nor do we find highly probative the Fogels’ inaction in 
registering their vehicles in Pennsylvania during that time.  
Indeed, because Amica had begun billing the Fogels on their 
policy in Pennsylvania before the accident (and the Fogels 
returned payment accordingly), if anything the passage of 
time under these circumstances would solidify the 
understanding that Pennsylvania had become the location of 
the insured risk for the foreseeable future.   
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August 2008 that the risk insured under the Fogels’ policy 
would be located in New Jersey.  
MacVicar elaborated on its analysis under § 193 of  
the Restatement by noting that,  
as a general proposition respecting the parties’ 
understanding of the location of the risk, we 
think it clear that every automobile insurer is on 
notice that because of the mobility both of 
automobiles and their owners, the 
circumstances of a particular loss may well 
result in the applicability of the law of a state 
other than that in which the policy was issued, 
and that is hence a predicate of the risks they 
underwrite. 
704 A.2d at 1347.   
MacVicar cited Parker v. State Farm Insurance Co., 
543 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.Pa. 1982), as “recognizing” this 
proposition.  Id.  The plaintiff in Parker was a resident of 
Chester, Pennsylvania who was involved in a motor vehicle 
accident with an uninsured motorist.  She obtained UIM 
benefits under her own policy, and then also claimed UIM 
benefits under her husband’s insurance policies with State 
Farm.  Parker, 543 F. Supp. at 807-08.  Her husband had 
been a Maryland resident when the State Farm policies were 
issued and delivered to him, but he and the plaintiff 
subsequently established residency in Pennsylvania before the 
accident occurred.  Id. at 808.  Similar to the situation here, 
the husband’s insurance provider denied the plaintiff’s 
attempt to recover under his plans because “stacking” was 
prohibited in Maryland.  
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Parker acknowledged that the State Farm policies, “as 
originally contemplated, have most of their relevant contacts 
with the State of Maryland.”  Id. at 810.  As was the case for 
the State of New Jersey in MacVicar and the case before us, 
in Parker “Maryland is the place where the parties resided or 
did business at the time of contracting, the place where the 
contract was negotiated and formed, and—perhaps most 
importantly—the state where the insured automobiles were 
expected to be located at the time of the policies’ creation.”  
Id.  
 However, Parker recognized that “a raw count of 
contacts cannot decide the question.  The importance of the 
various contacts depends on the nature of the particular 
contract and issues involved.”  Id (citing Restatement § 188 
cmt. b).  Thus, based on weighing each state’s contacts with 
the policy and their underlying interests, Parker concluded 
that Pennsylvania law should apply.  At the time of the 
accident “Pennsylvania had become the state of James 
Parker’s domicile and the state where the insured vehicles 
were principally garaged.”  Id. at 810-11.  The Court also 
noted, as MacVicar did, that in a § 193 analysis 
the “location of the insured risk” is of less 
importance in the context of [an] automobile 
liability insurance policy than it would be in the 
context of, for example, a policy of fire 
insurance for a building.  The mobility of the 
insured risk makes it possible that an accident 
covered by the policies will occur in a state 
other than the state where the automobile is 
principally garaged. Furthermore, in today’s 
mobile society, it is also foreseeable that a 
person covered by insurance may himself marry 
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and move from state to state, as plaintiff James 
Parker did here, and, thus, wholly change his 
domicile and the place where the automobile is 
garaged.  Thus, the possibility that another 
state’s law may be applied to determine 
questions arising out of automobile liability 
insurance policies made in Maryland cannot be 
totally unforeseen by an insurer in State Farm’s 
position. 
Id. at 810-11.  As Parker noted, comment d to § 193 explains 
that on “occasions when following the issuance of the policy 
the principal location of the risk is shifted to some other 
state,” the “other state will have a natural interest in the 
insurance of the risk and it may be that its local law should be 
applied to determine at least some issues arising under the 
policy.”  Restatement § 193 cmt. d.  In the case of automobile 
insurance contracts specifically, the mobility of the insured 
risk creates a foreseeable potential for the principal location 
of the risk to shift during the term of a policy.  In those 
situations, “application of the local law of the [state to which 
the insured risk has shifted] would hardly be unfair to the 
insurance company,” as the mobility of the insured risk itself 
provides reason to foresee “that there might be a shift to 
another state of the principal location of the risk.”  Id. 
The District Court here found Parker unpersuasive, 
essentially because it believed that Parker used a broad 
concept of foreseeability to read the “principal location of the 
insured risk” out of the § 193 analysis.  It found Parker’s 
diminished reliance on the principal location of the insured 
risk problematic because the Restatement instructs that “[t]he 
location of the insured risk will be given greater weight than 
any other single contact in determining the state of the 
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applicable law . . . .”  Restatement § 193 cmt. b; see also 
R&R at 25-27.  However, the District Court’s analysis fails to 
take into account the reason why the principal location of the 
insured risk is such a weighty factor.  As the Restatement 
comments state, courts focus on that factor because it 
ordinarily comports with the parties’ expectations regarding 
what law will apply to the insurance contract.  See 
Restatement § 193 cmt. c (A primary “rationale” is that “it 
can often be assumed that the parties . . . would expect that 
the local law of the state where the risk is to be principally 
located would be applied to determine many of the issues 
arising under the contract.”).  The comments further explain 
that in the case of movable items, such as motor vehicles, the 
expectation that the location of the insured risk will remain 
constant is diminished, even if it is not entirely eliminated.  
See id. cmt. d; id. cmt. b (explaining that this factor “enjoys 
greatest significance when an immovable” object, such as a 
building, is the subject of the insurance policy).  In sum, we 
do not view Parker as a dramatic departure from the 
Restatement approach, but simply as an application of the 
rationale expressed in the Restatement comments.  
Moreover, even if we discounted the foreseeability of 
motor vehicle owners relocating to other states during the 
term of a policy, as the District Court did in rejecting 
Parker’s reasoning, we would still reach the result we do 
today.  On both the facts of MacVicar and the case now 
before us, NJM and Amica each had actual knowledge that 
the principal location of the insured risk had already shifted 
from New Jersey to Pennsylvania based on direct 
communication of that fact by the insureds in each case.     
Thus, as in MacVicar, “[w]e are . . . satisfied that no 
state had a more significant relationship with this risk than 
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did Pennsylvania.  New Jersey’s relationship as the place 
where the policy was initially issued plainly became 
tangential after the severance of all other ties and connections 
[in New Jersey].”  704 A.2d at 1347. 
Governmental Interest Analysis 
Although we have concluded that Pennsylvania has the 
most significant relationship with the Fogels’ policy, we need 
to examine the “state policies affected by, and governmental 
interest in, the outcome of the controversy.”  Simmons, 84 
N.J. at 37.  Relying primarily on Parker and an earlier case in 
our Court, Travelers Insurance Co. v. Davis, 490 F.2d 536 
(3d Cir. 1974), MacVicar concluded that it was “clear that 
application of a governmental interest analysis points 
inexorably to Pennsylvania as well.”  704 A.2d at 1347.  We 
agree, and conclude that Pennsylvania’s underlying policy 
interests predominate.  
MacVicar explained that “Pennsylvania’s UIM 
stacking law is obviously predicated on its firm public policy 
of affording its residents the full advantage of all the 
insurance they have purchased.”  Id.  Indeed, its 
“commitment to that policy is . . . so strong that it prescribes 
the exact verbiage that an insured must assent to in writing 
before he will be deemed to have waived the benefit of that 
law.”  Id. (finding “no interest of New Jersey” that “could 
possibly override that of Pennsylvania” in this regard).  
Parker also attached great weight to Pennsylvania’s strong 
underlying interest in its UIM stacking policy.  Parker, 543 F. 
Supp. at 811 (emphasizing importance of “Pennsylvania’s 
strong interest in protecting its citizens’ rights to the full 
benefit of insurance provisions agreed to and coverage paid 
for”) (internal citation omitted).   
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In Travelers we held as well that Pennsylvania law 
applied in a choice-of-law dispute based on the 
Commonwealth’s strong interest in its UIM stacking policy.  
Travelers involved a Pennsylvania citizen who was killed in 
Texas in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist 
that occurred in the course of his employment.  His 
employer’s automobile liability insurance policy had been 
issued in Massachusetts.  As here, the insurance company 
sought a declaratory judgment that stacking was 
impermissible based on an argument that Pennsylvania law 
did not apply.  The District Court dismissed the insurer’s 
complaint.  In affirming the dismissal, we noted that while 
Massachusetts had some interest “because the contract was 
made there,” “Pennsylvania’s interest is the greatest because 
decedent and his executors are citizens of that state.  
Pennsylvania is vitally concerned with the administration of 
decedent’s estate and the well-being of the surviving 
dependents.”  Travelers, 490 F.2d at 543 (internal citation 
omitted).  Thus, we applied Pennsylvania law to determine 
the parties’ rights and obligations under the policy.   
*    *    *    *    * 
For these reasons, we conclude that although New 
Jersey has some interest in the Fogels’ policy—as the place of 
contracting and the initial location of both parties— after the 
Fogels notified Amica of their relocation to Pennsylvania, 
there was no longer a justified expectation that New Jersey 
remained the principal location of the insured risk.  All parties 
understood that the family’s cars, the insured risk, were to be 
garaged and primarily driven in Pennsylvania following their 
move.  Moreover, following MacVicar, Parker, and 
Travelers, we conclude that Pennsylvania’s strong underlying 
policy interest outweighs that of New Jersey in this case.  
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Hence we reverse the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment for Amica and remand so that summary judgment 
may be entered for the Fogels on the choice-of-law issue.   
IV.  THE FOGELS’ BAD FAITH COUNTERCLAIM  
The Fogels allege in their counterclaim that Amica 
acted in bad faith, under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371, by failing to 
investigate adequately their claim and improperly denying 
them stacking benefits under their policy.  Amica moved for 
summary judgment on this counterclaim, arguing that it had a 
reasonable basis for all actions taken based on its belief that 
New Jersey law applies.  It also notes that it had paid nearly 
$375,000 in claims to the Fogels under the policy as of the 
date it moved for summary judgment. 
In response, the Fogels argue that Amica’s claims 
adjuster assigned to their case did not complete a thorough 
investigation.  They note that the adjuster was aware that the 
Fogels had moved to Pennsylvania and that they had been 
billed for their policy in Pennsylvania prior to the accident at 
issue, but that he nonetheless failed to “consider the length of 
time that the Fogels were residing in Pennsylvania prior to the 
accident,” and also failed to determine “where the Fogels’ 
vehicles were being garaged” or “where their local driving 
was taking place . . . .”  Fogel Br. 29.  Finally, they argue that 
Amica’s advice to the Fogels regarding Pennsylvania’s 
vehicle registration procedures was contrary to Pennsylvania 
law and its own claims manual.  The District Court 
thoroughly examined the applicable law and rejected the 
Fogels’ counterclaim alleging bad faith.   
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In the primary case construing bad faith under  42 
Pa.C.S.A. § 8371, Terletsky v. Prudential Property & 
Casualty Co., the Superior Court of Pennsylvania explained: 
“Bad faith” on [the] part of [an] insurer is any 
frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay proceeds 
of a policy; it is not necessary that such refusal 
be fraudulent.  For purposes of an action against 
an insurer for failure to pay a claim, such 
conduct imports a dishonest purpose and means 
a breach of a known duty (i.e., good faith and 
fair dealing), through some motive of self-
interest or ill will; mere negligence or bad 
judgment is not bad faith. 
437 Pa. Super. 108, 125, 649 A.2d 680, 688 (Pa. Super Ct. 
1984) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 139 (6th ed. 
1990)).  Terletsky held that, “to recover under a claim of bad 
faith,” the insured must show that the insurer “did not have a 
reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy and 
that the insurer knew of or recklessly disregarded its lack of 
reasonable basis in denying the claim.”  Id.  Thus, an insurer 
may defeat a claim of bad faith by showing that it had a 
reasonable basis for its actions.  Horowitz v. Federal Kemper 
Life Assurance Co., 57 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 1995).  Our 
Court has described “the essence of a bad faith claim” as “the 
unreasonable and intentional (or reckless) denial of benefits.”  
UPMC Health Sys. v. Metro. Life. Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 497, 506 
(3d Cir. 2004).   
Bad faith “must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence and not merely insinuated.”  Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 
688 (collecting cases).  As the District Court noted, this 
heightened standard requires the insured to provide evidence 
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“so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable a clear 
conviction, without hesitation, about whether or not the 
defendants acted in bad faith.”  Bostick v. ITT Hartford Grp., 
56 F.Supp.2d 580, 587 (E.D.Pa. 1999) (citations omitted).  In 
deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court “must view 
the evidence presented in light of the [insured’s] substantive 
burden at trial.”  Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Babayan, 
430 F.3d 121, 137 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 
Because the District Court believed that Amica was 
correct in applying New Jersey law, it concluded that “it 
would be anomalous to find that the Fogels could 
nevertheless proceed on a claim of bad faith that is predicated 
in large part [on] the insureds’ contention that Amica’s claims 
adjuster engaged in bad faith in handling the claims . . . by 
construing the Policy under New Jersey law.”  R&R at 36.  
Although we part with the District Court on its conclusion 
that New Jersey law applied, we believe that if reasonable 
judges could reach that conclusion, as the Magistrate Judge 
and District Judge did in this case, the conduct alleged simply 
does not amount to bad faith.  See J.H. France Refractories 
Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. 1993) (noting 
that “it would be harsh indeed to attribute bad faith to parties 
which relied on the reasoning and approaches that other 
courts have found convincing”); cf. Babayan, 430 F.3d at 137 
n. 22 (“an insurer’s denial of a claim does not constitute bad 
faith if it is based on a reasonable legal position in an 
unsettled area of the law”) (citing Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 690).  
Thus, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment for Amica on the Fogels’ counterclaim alleging bad 




By the language and logic of Ferens, the Van Dusen 
rule applies to sua sponte transfers pursuant to § 1404(a).  In 
this case, the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the transferee 
forum, should have applied the choice-of-law rules that the 
District of New Jersey, the transferor, would have followed.  
New Jersey choice-of-law rules, laid out in Simmons and 
Gilbert and applied in the analogous case of MacVicar, leave 
no doubt that Pennsylvania law applies to this dispute.  Thus, 
we reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
for Amica on the choice-of-law issue and remand for 
summary judgment in favor of the Fogels on that issue.4
                                              
4 As noted above, the R&R points out (and indeed the parties 
do not dispute) that, under Pennsylvania law, the Fogels are 
entitled to stacked UIM benefits under the policy.  R&R at 
18.  Moreover, no dispute exists that, under Pennsylvania law, 
offsetting those benefits against amounts received from other 
insurance sources is not permitted.  Id. (“[T]he parties agree, 
and the Court recognizes, that Pennsylvania law does not 
permit insurers to offset UIM benefits against amounts 
received from other insurance sources, whereas New Jersey 
does.”).  What remains is the determination of the amount of 
relief afforded. 
  We 
affirm, however, the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment for Amica on the Fogels’ counterclaim of bad faith 
under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371.    
